WO 171/1258 - 3 Scots Guards - October 1944

Place	Date	Summary
HOLLAND	1	Battalion was by now fully concentrated in Area 4616, between GELDROP and EINDHOVEN.
	1	Church Services were held in the evening.
	2	Orders for an Operational role in the event of an enemy counter-attack on the East flank of the salient were received.
	3	Commanding Officer and Squadron Leaders recced areas of ASTEN and HELMOND, to which the Battaion was prepared to send squadrons at one hour’s notice and three hour’s notice respectively in order to block any counter-attack.
	4	All Officers down to Troop Leaders recced the same areas.
	5	Maintenance on tanks all day.
	6	Commanding Officer and Squadron Leaders attended a Conference at H.Q. 15 (S) DIVISION, at which an Operation in the area of the REICHSWALD FOREST, which was due to commence on 10 October, was discussed. Appendix D1.
	7	Squadron Leaders and Troop Leaders recced area in which forthcoming Operation was due to take place.
	7	The plan fore this Operation became firm.
	7	Commanding Officer held an ‘O’ Group in the evening.
	7	Shortly after this, information was received that the Operation was to be postponed indefinitely
	8	Church Parade 1000 hours.
	9	Right Flank and Left Flank moved into billets in GELDROP and EINDHOVEN respectively.
	10	Commanding Officer attended a Conference at 15 (S) DIVISION, at which planning for an Operation in the area South of WEERT was begun.
	10	H.Q. Squadron held a dance in EINDHOVEN.
	11	Commanding Officer and Adjutant to recce area in which forthcoming Operation to be known as “SIRIUS”, was to take place.
	11	Good Observation Posts were found in the churches at ZWARTBROEK 6294 and NEDERWEERT 6100.
	12	Further recces of area South of WEERT, down to Squadron Leaders.
	13	Operational Orders for Operation “SIRIUS” were received.
	13	Battalion was to attack in support of 46 (H) BRIGADE.
	14	Air photos of the area were studied by Commanding Officer and Squadron Leaders.
	15	Exercise “COCKSHY” took place in the area 5016, just East of GELDROP. Appendix D2.
	15	This was a rehearsal with 46 (H) BRIGADE, of which two Battalions were carried in KANGAROOS, for the move over a bridge, into an FUP, and further advance to an objective.
	15	One hour before the Exercise was due to start, Battalion was put on two hour’s notice to move to area of WEERT.
	15	At 1900 hours no movement orders had been received, and Squadron Leaders completed planning of Operation with the Commanders of the Infantry Battalions they were to support.
	15	Half an hour after the Battalion Commanders had left, information was received that the Operation was indefinitely postponed.
	15	During the night orders were received for a move to the area of North of OVERLOON, where the Battalion was to be in support of 3 BRITISH INFANTRY DIVISION, with the rest of 6 GUARDS TANK BRIGADE, who had been fighting in this area since 10 October.
	16	Battalion moved to area 7433, North of OVERLOON, starting at 0745 hours and completing move by 1400 hours. Appendix D3.
	16	Battalion was placed in support of 9 BRITISH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
	17	Recces for an attack next day were carried out by Commanding Officer, with Commander 9 BRITISH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
	17	Squadron Leaders visited the Battalions in this BRIGADE which they were respectively detailed to support.
	17	Recce Officer Left Flank recced River in area 7931 - with the eventuality in view of 3rd Tank Battalion SCOTS GUARDS supporting this BRIGADE in an advance South East towards VENLO.
	17	This River was found to be a tank obstacle, with very muddy approaches on both sides.
	18	Three tanks from Left Flank went to the area of 6th Battalion K.O.S.B. in order to try, at a range of almost 4,000 yards, to demolish a large concrete building on the banks of the MAAS which the enemy were using as an Observation Post.
	18	The attempt was unsuccessful.
	19	Commanding Officer visited 185 INFANTRY BRIGADE Commander, and then went to 6 GUARDS TANK BRIGADE H.Q. to meet the CORPS Commander. Appendix D4.
	19	Orders were received for a move back to 15 (S) DIVISION area.
	20	Battalion moved to area 5827 (between GEMERT and BAKEL).
	21	Baths at HELMOND.
	22	Commanding Officer attended a Conference at 15 (S) DIVISION, at which orders were given for a set piece attack by 46 (H) BRIGADE supported by 3rd Tank Battalion SCOTS GUARDS from the area East of BEST 3726 to OIRSCHOT 3125.
	22	Recces were made in the area of BEST, where the Church was found to be a good Observation Post.
	23	Further recces and plannings for this Operation.
	24	Enemy were reported to be withdrawing from area West of BEST.
	24	At 1100 hours Battalion was put on immediate notice to move, and at 1500 hours moved to area of ZON 4426.
	24	Commanding Officer attended an ‘O’ Group at 46 (H) BRIGADE at 2100 hours, and held an ‘O’ Group on his return at 2230 hours.
	25	Battalion formed part of 46 (H) BRIGADE GROUP in an advance Westwards from BEST.
	25	Forming up by 0900 hours on the wide main road running South from BEST, Right Flank in support of 2 GORDON HIGHLANDERS formed the advance guard.
	25	They passed through OIRSCHOT, which was already held by 44 (L) BRIGADE GROUP, and SPOORDONK 2827, which recce elements had reached the night before.
	25	A small enemy rearguards in the area 2430 (two miles East of MOERGESTEL) caused the deployment of the advance guard, but as soon as it was realised that this rearguard had withdrawn, tanks were pushed up to the bridge at MOERGESTEL with all speed.
	25	The Bridge was found blown.
	25	An attempt to wade through the river was unsuccessful.
	25	Two CHURCHILL Bridgelayer tanks were brought up, and all tanks had been passed over these by 1530 hours.
	25	The Recce Troop with one company 2nd Battalion GORDON HIGHLANDERS in KANGAROOS made a dash for the bridge into TILBURG at 177327, light failing them when the tanks were 400 yards short of the bridge.
	25	Here the Recce Troop found itself in the middle of what seemed to be a German Company position and a brisk engagement took place in which losses were inflicted on the enemy.
	25	During it three HONEYS were bogged, and attempts at recovery had to be made under heavy M.G. fire.
	25	These were successful except in the case of one tank, which had to be abandoned until next morning.
	25	The Recce Troop eventually withdrew after dark, having caused considerable damage to the enemy in the surrounding farmhouses which were occupied.
	25	Left Flank and 7th Battalion SEAFORTHS advanced North toward OISTERWIJK 2334, where the bridge was found blown and covered by small arms and mortar fire.
	25	This advance was carried out with 15 Troop and the Squadron Leaders tank acting as point of the advance guard.
	25	The Troop Leaders tank charged through a road block just short of the blown bridge, and the Troop managed to deploy and engage the enemy firing at them from the opposite bank of the river.
	25	A spirited and successful fire engagement was fought, but Lance-Serjeant MARSDEN, the Troop Corporal, was killed when a mortar burst on top of his tank.
	25	'S’ Squadron and 9th Battalion CAMERONIANS advanced to area 1931, and Right Flank and 2nd Battalion GORDON HIGHLANDERS to area 2030.
	26	Left Flank supported 7th Battalion SEAFORTH up to the river South of OISTERWIJK in an Operation which cleared half of this town.
	26	In spite of considerable opposition, a number of prisoners being taken.
	26	Whilst the squadron was forming up in the dark Lieutenant RAMSAY was killed and S.S.M. PRICE wounded by an air burst.
	26	'S’ Squadron supported their Infantry forward against light opposition to the area of Bridge 177327, which was found blown (probably 1 1/2 hours before they reached it).
	26	Right Flank moved to area South of OISTERWIJK.
	26	Infantry patrols got across the broken bridge into TILBURG.
	27	Recce Troop patrolled in the morning to the Canal line North North East of TILBURG, where slight opposition was met.
	27	In the afternoon Left Flank carried 7th Battalion SEAFORTH to this same area, where 7th Battalion SEAFORTH patrols crossed the Canal into TILBURG without opposition.
	27	In the evening all Squadrons were pulled back into the area 1933.
	28	Second-in-Command went into TILBURG to recce billets, but at 1100 hours Battalion was put at one hour’s notice to move.
	28	At 1400 hours the Battalion was told to be prepared to move East early next morning.
	28	At 1510 hours orders for this move were received, and at 1600 hours Battalion started moving via EINDHOVEN and GELDROP to the other side of the so-called NIJMEGEN salient, where a German counter-attack had captured MEIJEL 7006 and was said to be threatening SECOND ARMY H.Q. at HELMOND.
	28	The tanks arrived in a harbour area just North of ASTEN 6113 by 0130 hours next morning.
	28	'A’ Echelon was dropped off at ZOMEREN 5911.
	29	During a day full of extraordinary rumours concerning the progress and success of this German counter-attack, at 1100 hours tank squadrons moved out at short notice to areas South and East of ASTEN to cover this road centre in support of the Infantry battalions of 227 (H) BRIGADE under whose command the Battalion now was.
	29	The enemy advance was said to be being made with two Panzer Divisions, the 9th and the 15th.
	29	No enemy were seen during this day.
	30	7 U.S. ARMY DIVISION which had been holding this sector of the line was withdrawn, and the Battalion in support of 227 (H) BRIGADE moved up to take over their positions, whilst the rest of 15 (S) DIVISION and 6 GUARDS TANK BRIGADE were concentrating behind them.
	30	The expected enemy attack did not materialise, though shelling and mortaring were fairly heavy.
	30	Right Flank were attacked in harbour during the night, but drove off the enemy with losses.
	30	15 Troop of Left Flank carried out an attack on an occupied farm in co-operation with a company of 2nd Battalion GORDONS.
	30	This resulted in the capture of 23 Prisoners.
	31	No change in situation.
	31	Shelling still fairly heavy.
	31	Squadrons were located as follows:-
	31	Right Flank area 6310, in support of 10th Battalion H.L.I.
	31	Left Flank area 6311, in support of 2nd Battalion CAMERONS.
	31	'S’ Squadron area 6212, in support of 2nd Battalion A.&S.H.

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