| Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Vol. 1. and the Staff Manual respectively Title pages will be prepared in manuscript. |
WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY |
Army Form C.2118 |
| Unit: HQ 11 Armoured Division | ||
| Month and Year: July 1944 | (Erase heading not required). | Commanding Officer: Major-Gen. G.P.B. Roberts DSO, MC |
| Place | Date | Hour | Summary | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Normandy | 1 | Sitrep 1200 hrs | 1A | |
| 1 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.13 (Copy No.48) | 1B | ||
| 1 | Day's events | 1C | ||
| 2 | List of place code names | 1D | ||
| 2 | Sitrep 1800 hrs | 1E | ||
| 2 | Day's events | 1F | ||
| 3 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.14 (Copy No.47) | 1G | ||
| 3 | Day's events | 1H | ||
| 3 | 11 Armd Div Standing Orders Amendment No.5 | 1J | ||
| 4 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.15 (Copy No.41) | 1K | ||
| 4 | Day's events | 1L | ||
| 5 | Sitrep 1145 hrs | 1M | ||
| 5 | Sitrep 2200 hrs | 1N | ||
| 5 | Sitrep 2230 hrs | 1O | ||
| 5 | 11 Armd Div Op Instr No.3 (Copy No.19) | 1P | ||
| 5 | Day's events | 1Q | ||
| 6 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.16 (Copy No.41) | 1R | ||
| 6 | Day's events | 1S | ||
| 6 | Sitrep 2200 hrs | 1T | ||
| Normandy | 7 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.17 | 1U | |
| 7 | 11 Armd Div OO No.2 (Copy No.50) | 1V | ||
| 7 | 11 Armd Div Gen Instrs No.10 | 1W | ||
| 7 | Day's events | 1X | ||
| 8 | Sitrep 0100 hrs | 1Y | ||
| 8 | Place code names period 9-15 Jul | 1Z | ||
| 8 | Sitrep 1115 hrs | 2A | ||
| 8 | Sitrep 1345 hrs | 2B | ||
| 8 | 159 Inf Bde report on methods used to defeat German Tactics etc | 2C | ||
| 9 | Sitrep 0045 hrs | 2D | ||
| 9 | Sitrep 1500 hrs | 2E | ||
| 9 | 11 Armd Div General Instruction No.12 | 2F | ||
| 9 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.18 (Copy No.41) | 2G | ||
| 9 | Sitrep 2350 hrs | 2H | ||
| 10 | Sitrep 2340 hrs | 2J | ||
| 10 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.19 (Copy No.42) | 2K | ||
| 11 | Sitrep 2345 hrs | 2L | ||
| 11 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.20 (Copy No.43) | 2M | ||
| 12 | Change of Command | 2N | ||
| 12 | Sitrep 2350 hrs | 2O | ||
| Normandy | 13 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.21 (Copy No.42) | 2P | |
| 14 | Sitrep 0110 hrs | 2Q | ||
| 15 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.22 (Copy No.39) | 2R | ||
| 16 | 11 Armd Div OO No.3 Copy No.46 and Amendment No.1 | 2S | ||
| 13-17 | Days events | 2T | ||
| 17 | Sitrep giving gen situation | 2U | ||
| 18 | Day's events | 2V | ||
| 19 | Sitrep 0230 hrs | 2X | ||
| 19 | Sitrep 1444 hrs | 2Y | ||
| 19 | Sitrep 2200 hrs | 2Z | ||
| 19 | Sitrep 2359 hrs | 3A | ||
| 19 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.23 Copy No.44 | 3B | ||
| 19 | Day's events | 3C | ||
| 20 | Sitrep 0820 hrs | 3D | ||
| 20 | Sitrep No.049 | 3E | ||
| 20 | GOC's message | 3F | ||
| 20 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.24 Copy No.46 | 3G | ||
| 20 | Days events | 3H | ||
| Normandy | 21 | Sitrep 1325 hrs | 3J | |
| 21 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.25 (Copy No.48) | 3K | ||
| 21 | 11 Armd Div Mov OrderNo.1 | 3L | ||
| 21 | Day's events | 3M | ||
| 22 | Sitrep 2359 hrs | 3N | ||
| 22 | Day's events | 3O | ||
| 23 | Sitrep 1255 hrs | 3P | ||
| 23 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.26 Copy No.50 | 3Q | ||
| 23 | Tank and crew cas for ops 18 and 19 Jul | 3R | ||
| 24 | Lessons from battle SE of CAEN 18-21 Jul from 159 Inf Bde | 3S | ||
| 24 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.27 Copy No.51 | 3T | ||
| 24 | Sitrep 2359 hrs | 3U | ||
| 25 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.28 Copy No.55 | 3V | ||
| 25 | Sitrep 1115 hrs (come under command 12 Corps) | 3W | ||
| 25 | Sitrep 2330 hrs | 3X | ||
| 26 | Sitrep 1300 hrs | 3Y | ||
| 26 | 11 Armd Div Int Summary No.29 Copy No.56 | 3Z | ||
| 27 | 11 Armd Div Op Instr No.4 Copy No.14 | 4A | ||
| France | 29 | On July 29, the division moved across the Second Army bridgehead via BAYEUX. This proved a long and tedious process for the roads in that constricted area were packed with traffic of all sorts which no movement instruction however careful or authoritative seemed capable of clearing. | ||
| 29 | 2200 | By nightfall our forces were concentrated between BALLEROY and CAUMONT, the front-line town of the sector recently captured by the Americans. | ||
| 29 | For the advance which was to start at 0700 hrs on the next day fresh brigade groupings were adopted. The experience of 7 Armoured Division and the Americans in the bocage country had demonstrated the necessity for the closest co-operation of tanks and infantry. In this region of thick woods and narrow roads winding between impassable hedges and ditches, num[...] local engagements were anti[...] and under these conditions reasonable progress could be assured by the infantry moving with the tanks on all routes and often actually riding on them. | Appendix No.1 | ||
| France | 29 | The division therefore moved in Brigade Groups; 29 Armoured Brigade Group on the left consisting of two of their armoured regiments (23 H and 3 RTR) the motor battalion (8 RB) and one infantry battalion from 159 (3 MON); and 159 Infantry Brigade Group on the right with their remaining two units (4 KSLI and 1 Hereford), one armoured regiment (2 FF Yeo) and the armoured recce regiment (2 N Yeo) now as usual employed as a normal tank unit. | ||
| 30 | On the left where the advance coincided with that of 15 (S) Division, little or no enemy opposition was actually encountered; but the difficult nature of the country and the bad condition of the roads made progress slow. Woods […] the road had to be investigated as the recent […] of the enemy was displayed by the number of mines which were met. | |||
| 30 | 2200 | This route let from LE VALLEE just south-west of CAUMONT to skirt SEPT VENTS, thence just to the east of […] and so down to ST MARTIN DES BESACES. By last light the leading troops were about a mile to the south-west of […]. | ||
| 30 | 1800 | Meanwhile on the right where we were flanked by 5 […] Infantry Division strong enemy resistence developed at CUSSY and in the surrounding woods. One of the battalions of 159 Infantry Brigade Group (1 Hereford) had to fight a stiff battle before this could be overcome. This operation occupied most of the day and cost the battalion fairly heavy casualties especially to one company. CUSSY was eventually cleared by 1800 hrs and the other infantry battalion (4 KSLI) together with one armoured regimetn (2 FF Yeo) pushed on to capture LA BAISSELIERE. | ||
| 30 | Opposition was everywhere stubborn and several tanks were lost on mines. On the whole progress had been satisfactory and compared favourably – perhaps rather too fabrouably – with that made by the troops on our right and left. Effective use was made of supporting aircraft through-out the day. | |||
| 30 | From now on it may confidently be asserted that the division considered its role as an independent advance rather than simply the protection of a flank. The enemy position was based on the FORET L'EVEQUE and the east and west road through ST MARTIN DES BESACES, and it was considered that we were best placed to break through this line and push south to next commanding position – the high ground east and west of LE BENY BOCAGE. So we were first to capture the important road junction of ST MARTIN itself and hand it over to 15 (S) Division then to try and find a way round or through the FORET L'EVEQUE. Instead of protection somebody else's flank, it was now hoped that someone woudl protect our own. Once again the division was sticking its neck out but this time conditions were different. The close country of which we had once been so apprehensive proved far more friendly to our tanks than the open expanses of the CAEN plain. Above all it was felt that the enemy who was now showing signs of cracking in the west might here too be overthrown by a sudden coup and an important victory might be won. | |||
| 30 | 2300 | That night 2 WG came under command and took over our right flank protection from 2 N Yeo for one day only. | Appendix No.2 | |
| France | 31 | The advance towards the ST MARTIN road continued by night.By early morning 29 Brigade Group had bumped fairly stiff opposition and 159 Brigade Group were the first to reach the main road. An attack on ST MARTIN thus became possible from two directions with 29 holding from the North and 159 moving on the place from the west. | Appendix No.3 | |
| 31 | 1100 | The village was entered by 1100 hrs (31 July) but the importance of its capture was soon forgotten in the excitement over a piece of news at 1030 hrs. | ||
| 31 | At this time there were two armoured car regiments under the division's command and one of these (2 HCR) patrolling in front of 159 Brigade Group had found a track through the FORET L'EVEQUE which was neither blocked by mines nor held by the enemy. This track evidently formed the boundary between two enemy divisions, 3 Para and 326 Infantry and apparently the enemy omitted to make it inclusive to either formation or the formation responsible had omitted to guard it. This theory was confirmed subsequently by a radio intercept which presented the route in question as a subject of dispute between the two German commanders concerned. | |||
| 31 | Down this track therefore, had gone a troop of armoured cars and emerging from the forest, they discovered that the bridge over the River Ondeleure on the main road from MONT BERTROND to LE BENY BOCAGE was also unprotected and promptly seized it. Two hours later they were joined by a troop of tanks from 2 N Yeo who had made their way through the forest only after overcoming the opposition of two German SP guns. This force held the vital bridge for the next six hours by which time it had been decided to push the entire division over it and the leading tanks of 29 Brigade Group had arrived on this mission. | |||
| France | 31 | The capture of this bridge and the advance southward which it made possible was unquestionably a turning-point in the campaign in France. The battle beyond CAEN had obstructed the collection of a counter-attack force sufficient to halt the American drive further west. This advance prevented the immediate reinforcement of that force. In order that the coup might be exploited the Army plan was changed and its most westerly troops now became officially the main striking force. The commanding heights around LE BENY BOCAGE, originally the objective not even of 15 (S) Div but of 30 Corps now lay within our grasp: and we were ordered after securing them to push on with all speed to ETOUVY (6338). |
Disclaimer: This War Diary is based on its original, but typos might be corrected. For historical research, always check the originals.
